The China Mirage Read online

  On March 17, 1905, Theodore and Edith Roosevelt awoke early, left the White House, and took a morning train to New York City. The First Couple paraded with thousands up Fifth Avenue in celebration of St. Patrick’s Day. Soon after three o’clock, Teddy and Edith exited the procession, walked east along Seventy-Sixth Street for half a block, and then entered a private home. They were there for an important family wedding. Teddy was to give away the bride; his niece Eleanor Roosevelt was marrying his fifth cousin Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

  The four Roosevelts had last seen each other two weeks earlier at Teddy’s March 4 inauguration ceremony, where he’d made the ringing appeal “All I ask is a square deal for every man.” Twenty-year-old Eleanor was more famous than twenty-three-year-old Franklin; she was the president’s “orphan” niece, as the New York Times called her, the daughter of Teddy’s deceased brother, Elliott.

  At three thirty sharp, Teddy’s daughter Alice, dressed in a white veil and holding a bouquet of pink roses, led the wedding procession down the wide flight of stairs from the third to the second floor. Behind the six bridesmaids came the president with Eleanor on his arm. The New York Times noted that Eleanor wore a pearl collar and a diamond bowknot. Theodore Roosevelt gave Eleanor Roosevelt to Franklin Roosevelt. The Reverend Endicott Peabody, founder and head of the Groton School—Franklin’s prep-school alma mater—performed the ceremony.

  A majority of the wedding guests had something in common: their families had made their fortunes in the China opium trade. Eleanor’s jewelry and Franklin’s money came not from the Roosevelts but from the Delano line. Reverend Peabody was wealthy because his grandfather Joseph Peabody had made a fortune dealing drugs in New China. Paul Forbes, descendant of the man who had replaced Warren as consul in Canton and who had hosted Commodore Perry, was in attendance. A. A. Low was there, a descendant of Warren Delano’s opium friend, the man who had provided the ship in which the Delano family sailed to Hong Kong. The bloodlines of many of the guests intertwined, owing to numerous marriages among the Cushings, Cabots, and other families, all clans with roots in the most profitable commodity trade of the nineteenth century.

  Back in Washington after the wedding, Roosevelt informed Kaneko that he was about to leave for a monthlong bear hunt in Colorado’s snowy Rocky Mountains. The baron noted that Russia’s symbol was the bear and joked that he hoped Roosevelt would kill one. Roosevelt promised he would bag a bear for Meiji.

  In March of 1905, when wave after wave of Japanese soldiers ran directly into Russian bullets during Japan’s victory at the Battle of Mukden, Roosevelt wrote, “The Japanese are the most dashing fighters in the world!”46 For the first time in modern history, an Asian country was besting a white Western Christian country. Roosevelt wrote Kaneko on White House stationery, “Judging by the state of affairs, all is going well and your army is advancing at full speed and power. Banzai!!”47 When the baron later arrived at the White House for a celebration of the Mukden victory, Roosevelt’s “face shone with joy over the unprecedented victory.”48 After his chat with Kaneko, Roosevelt told Secretary of War William Howard Taft, “I heartily agree with the Japanese terms of peace, insofar as they include Japan having the control of Korea.”49

  Roosevelt wrote to Kaneko after the Japanese navy defeated its Russian counterpart in the largest sea battle in world history, the Battle of Tsushima, “This is the greatest phenomenon the world has ever seen… I grew so excited that I myself became almost like a Japanese, and I could not attend to official duties.”50

  Though Japan appeared to be powerful—winning every battle against the Russians—the war was bleeding the tiny nation of men and money, while Russia had comparably inexhaustible resources. Prince Ito knew that Roosevelt had earlier told Baron Kaneko he was willing to mediate a settlement between the two countries while favoring the Japanese. Ito now gave the green light to begin the negotiations.

  On May 31, Roosevelt received a telegram from Prince Ito requesting that the president invite Russia and Japan to open direct negotiations. Ito and Teddy agreed to keep Teddy’s close communications with Tokyo a secret, as Roosevelt wrote to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge:

  I have of course concealed from everyone—literally everyone—the fact that I acted in the first place on Japan’s suggestion.… Remember that you are to let no one know that in this matter of the peace negotiations I have acted at the request of Japan and that each step has been taken with Japan’s foreknowledge, and not merely with her approval but with her expressed desire.51

  Roosevelt saw no need for China to participate in a peace conference that would give away Chinese territory. As Howard Beale observed in Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power, “Blinded by his concept of the Chinese as a backward people, he utterly failed to comprehend or take into account the rise of an independent and assertive China to a role of major importance in the twentieth century.”52

  Roosevelt discussed the peace negotiations with Baron Kaneko, knowing that Prince Ito would be apprised of the supposedly secret details. Kaneko was astonished that the president revealed so many confidential matters to him, but Roosevelt explained that he was able to speak to Kaneko without reservation as he was a fellow Harvard alumnus.

  On July 2, Roosevelt announced that Russia and Japan would negotiate a treaty in Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

  On the afternoon of Friday, July 7, 1905, Baron Kaneko strolled out of Manhattan’s Hotel Leonori, went to the train station, and boarded the 4:50 train bound for Oyster Bay, on his way to spend the night at Sagamore Hill, Roosevelt’s Long Island mansion. “Coming to see us here [in the White House,] you don’t get an accurate idea of what our family life really is,” Teddy had told Kaneko at one point. He had invited Kaneko to Oyster Bay, saying, “Then you will know more about us.”53

  Kaneko disembarked at the Oyster Bay station and waited for the president’s train, which arrived soon after. Kaneko wrote that when the two men encountered each other on the train platform, Roosevelt welcomed him “with a face beaming all over with joy.”54

  Roosevelt’s wood-and-stone home made a favorable impression on the descendant of samurai: “Compared with vacation houses of American politicians and wealthy men of property, the structure and decoration are very plain, and this is admirable in a president who advocates the ‘simple life.’ ”55

  At about eleven o’clock, Roosevelt and Kaneko withdrew to the president’s study, where they talked about the peace negotiations. At around midnight, the two men grew tired. Kaneko recalled the tender manner in which Roosevelt made sure he was settled for the night:

  The President… lit two candles, one of which he gave me, while he carried the other himself, and showed me to my bedroom upstairs. Thinking that the bed cover was too thin and that I would be cold in the night—he explained that a cold northeast wind usually came from the bay after midnight—he went downstairs and returned with a blanket on his shoulder.56

  After breakfast the next day, Roosevelt led Kaneko out onto the porch where they could talk alone. Now the president readied himself for a momentous suggestion that Roosevelt knew Kaneko would relay to Emperor Meiji. It was an idea that would lead to a future day of infamy.

  Kaneko later recalled what Roosevelt told him:

  Japan is the only nation in Asia that understands the principles and methods of Western civilization. She has proved that she can assimilate Western civilization, yet not break up her own heritage. All the Asiatic nations are now faced with the urgent necessity of adjusting themselves to the present age. Japan should be their natural leader in that process, and their protector during the transition stage, much as the United States assumed the leadership of the American continent many years ago, and by means of the Monroe Doctrine, preserved the Latin American nations from European interference, while they were maturing their independence. If President Monroe had never enunciated the doctrine, which bears his name, the growth of the independent South America republics would have been interfered with by influences
foreign to this continent. The future policy of Japan towards Asiatic countries should be similar to that of the United States towards their neighbors on the American continent. A “Japanese Monroe Doctrine” in Asia will remove the temptation to European encroachment, and Japan will be recognized as the leader of the Asiatic nations, and her power will form the shield behind which they can reorganize their national systems.… I will support [Japan] with all my power, either during my Presidency or after its expiration.57

  Roosevelt dispatched his number-two man to Tokyo to seal the deal. Three weeks after Baron Kaneko’s sleepover at Sagamore Hill, Secretary of War Taft arrived in Tokyo on a secret mission: to make Roosevelt’s vision of a Japanese Monroe Doctrine official.58

  Early on the morning of Thursday, July 27, Taft and Prime Minister Taro Katsura met secretly with no one else but an interpreter, who took no notes. (Taft later summarized the discussion in a secret memorandum to Roosevelt.) The order of topics and the content of the conversation were modeled on previous talks between President Roosevelt and Baron Kaneko.

  Secretary Taft and Prime Minister Katsura first discussed race, agreeing that the yellow men of Japan posed no threat to the West. As an up-front quid pro quo, Katsura assured Taft that “Japan does not harbor any aggressive designs whatever on the Philippines.” Katsura said that peace would come to North Asia only with an understanding between Japan, the U.S., and the UK. He realized that the U.S. Senate would not approve of what he was discussing but, as Taft noted, “in view of our common interests [Kaneko] could not see why some good understanding or an alliance in practice, if not in name, should not be made between these three nations insofar as respects the affairs in the Far East.”59

  Taft told him that the United States was “fully in accord with the policy of Japan and Great Britain in the maintenance of peace in the Far East” and that “whatever occasion arose, appropriate action of the Government of the United States, in conjunction with Japan and Great Britain… could be counted on by them quite as confidently as if the United States were under treaty obligation.”60 Taft’s commitment to support Japan’s expansion into Korea—“as if the United States were under treaty obligation”—would remain secret for almost two decades.61

  Upon reading Taft’s summary of the meeting, Teddy secretly cabled his secretary of war: “Your conversation with Count Katsura absolutely correct in every respect. Wish you would state to Katsura that I confirm every word you have said.”62 The New York Times soon published an interview with Prime Minister Katsura in which he said,

  The introduction of all the blessings of modern civilization into the East Asiatic countries—that is our Far Eastern policy and behind it there is no more selfish motive than a simple desire for our own commercial and educational betterment. China and Korea are both atrociously misgoverned. They are in the hands of a lot of corrupt officials whose ignorance and narrow-mindedness are a constant menace to political tranquility in the Far East. These conditions we will endeavor to correct at the earliest possible date—by persuasion and education, if possible; by force, if necessary, and in this, as in all things, we expect to act in exact concurrence with the ideas and desires of England and the United States.63

  In Seoul, Emperor Gojong had no idea that President Roosevelt, rather than standing up for Korean freedom as he was obliged to do by treaty, had instead approved Korea’s death warrant. A court official in Seoul had assured a Western reporter, “We have the promise of America. She will be our friend whatever happens.”64

  In early September, the Russians and the Japanese signed the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, which, among other things, gave Prince Ito what he sought: control of Korea. After the treaty was announced, Roosevelt forwarded to friends highly selective accounts of his dealings with European heads of state Czar Nicholas and Kaiser Wilhelm. Based on these retellings, Roosevelt was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.65 Teddy kept mum about his extensive dealings with Emperor Meiji, thus cutting this critical U.S.-Japan story from American history.

  Roosevelt threw a farewell party for Kaneko at Sagamore Hill on September 10, 1905, the seventh and last time the president hosted the baron at the Summer White House. After a family lunch, Roosevelt led Kaneko to his study and asked for advice on a presidential letter to Emperor Meiji. Then the two men walked to the living room, where Teddy had spread three large bearskins on the floor. Pointing to the largest, Roosevelt said, “This is the bearskin which I promised before. [Please] present it to the Emperor, and tell him that it is a souvenir from me to commemorate the Russo-Japanese War.”66

  Emperor Gojong of Korea: “We feel that America is to us as an elder brother,” Gojong said. (CPA Media / Pictures From History)

  Kaneko thanked Roosevelt and promised to give the presidential bearskin to Meiji. Then he brought up their earlier chat on the porch, when Roosevelt had suggested a Japanese Monroe Doctrine for Asia. Kaneko asked the president to go public with the idea.67 Roosevelt hedged: “I have no objection to your making this suggestion privately to the leaders of your country’s government, but I would like you to delay making a public announcement for the time being. The reason is that I would like to announce it publicly to the world myself after my term of office has expired.”68

  Kaneko later wrote that at that point Edith strolled into the room, and the moment between the two men vanished. The three friends walked out onto the expansive lawn for their final good-bye.

  Mission accomplished, Baron Kaneko returned to Japan. In several royal audiences attended by Prince Ito, Kaneko regaled Emperor Meiji with stories of his “public diplomacy” with President Roosevelt and the American media and people.

  With Roosevelt’s green light, Korea was now within Meiji’s grasp, a goal he had pursued through two wars. To reward Prince Ito, Meiji asked him to be Japan’s first civilian ruler of Korea. Ito would travel to Korea to inform the Korean emperor that his country now belonged to Japan.

  Emperor Gojong knew the Japanese noose around his country’s neck was tightening, and he reached out to Elder Brother Theodore Roosevelt by sending an American emissary, Homer Hulbert, to Washington. Hulbert was a Cornell graduate who had gone to Korea in 1886 as an educational missionary, and he and Emperor Gojong had become close.

  Emperor Gojong asked Hulbert to appeal to President Roosevelt and ask him to use America’s bully pulpit to forestall Japan’s takeover of Korea. Hulbert later wrote,

  The appeal of the Emperor to the President of the United States cited the fact that Korea has heretofore received many tokens of good-will from the American government and people, that the American representatives have been sympathetic and helpful, and that American teachers of all kinds have done valuable work… he asked the President to bring to bear upon this question the same breadth of view and the same sympathy which had characterized his distinguished career in other fields; and if, after a careful investigation, the facts above enumerated and others that would come to light should seem to warrant him in so doing, he should use his friendly offices to prevent the disaster to Korea which seemed imminent. It will be noted that the Emperor asked that the President’s action be based upon a careful examination of all the facts, and not upon mere hearsay.69

  Homer Hulbert. Emperor Gojong dispatched Hulbert to Washington to plead for Korea’s independence with President Theodore Roosevelt. (No credit given, part of the Public Domain)

  Japanese detectives trailed Hulbert when he traveled to the U.S., and he later wrote, “The Japanese surmised what was being done. A Japanese spy on board the steamer at Yokohama discovered the exact hour when the message would arrive in Washington, and from that very hour events were hurried to their culmination in the Korean capital.”70

  When Hulbert reached Washington, both President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Elihu Root refused to see him. They were waiting for Japan’s other shoe to drop in Seoul. As Hulbert later recalled,

  At the moment when Japan was just crouching to spring at the throat of Korea, the emperor of Korea called upon
President Roosevelt to keep America’s treaty with him—a treaty which held in its first clause the promise that if Korea were endangered by any third party this government would use its good offices to effect an amicable arrangement. Roosevelt refused to read, or even to receive the written message sent to him from the emperor of a friendly power with which we were supposedly on friendly relations. That written message was taken to the state department, but the secretary of state refused to receive it for 48 hours. Meanwhile Japan at the point of the sword had forced her “protectorate” upon Korea.71

  On November 15, 1905, Prince Ito shocked the Korean emperor by telling him that Japan would now control Korea and that Gojong would report to Ito. Emperor Gojong resisted, hoping that some force like Elder Brother Theodore Roosevelt would stay Japan’s hand. Ito threatened Gojong, telling the Korean monarch that he had to agree to Japan’s terms because Emperor Meiji had already approved the use of the Japanese military to overthrow Gojong if he refused. Defiant, Gojong told Ito to go try his luck with the Korean cabinet ministers.

  Prince Ito ordered Gojong’s cabinet to meet with him in the Japanese legation building in two days, on November 17, 1905. After hearing Ito’s shocking demands, the Korean officials patriotically insisted that they would not forfeit their country. In response, Ito ordered the Japanese military police out of their barracks and onto the streets. (Japanese troops had occupied Korea since the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War.) According to a Korean account, Japanese “machine guns were everywhere in the streets, and even field guns were brought out to command the strategic points of the city. They made feint attacks, occupied gates, put their guns into position, and did everything short of actual violence to prove to the Koreans that they were prepared to enforce their demands.”72